Wednesday 3 June 2009

Breaking Transfers

A request!

Partner and I have been discussing a more liberal attitude to transfer breaks after a 2NT opening. I've suggested breaking should be mandatory with any 4-card holding, regardless of the rest of opener's hand, on the grounds that 10 tricks must stand a chance with a 6-4 fit even if responder has a Yarborough. Obviously it's not so good if it's a 5-4 fit, but most of the time responder will have a few scattered points.

If you have an idle moment, please can you simulate expected number of tricks holding 0,1,2,3... etc. HCP opposite a balanced 20-22 HCP (a) when the fit is 5-4 (b) when the fit is 6-4?

This one shouldn't be too tricky. Let's give ourselves a 20-22 2NT opener with four hearts and give partner a hand with five or more hearts. He transfers and you are wondering whether you should super-accept or if the 3 level is the right place to play.

Over 10,000 deals, we made the following numbers of tricks:

6            5
7 39
8 283
9 946
10 2156
11 3148
12 2439
13 984

In other words, we made game 87%, made precisely 3H 9.5% and couldn't make 3H 3.3% of the time. On the face of it, it looks pretty good for bashing game every time because the chances are very good that it'll make.

But this is playing partner for the full possible range of his bid. On a large proportion of these deals, he won't be passing the transfer out and game won't be missed anyway. So let's look at those deals where partner has not very many points:

Pts       4H    3H    tot    
0 55 57 188
1 160 145 388
2 275 185 520
3 602 188 843
4 926 185 1143
5 1095 102 1209

Here it tells us that if partner has a Yarborough you'll make game on 55/188 occasions (29%), you'll make your partscore on 57/188 occasions (30%) and go off in 3H the rest of the time (40%). And things, unsurprisingly, get better as partner gets more points.

If you take the full 0-3 range, where partner would probably pass your transfer, you're making game 56% of the time.

Now, I haven't taken into account the possibility of being doubled. It might make a difference occasionally, especially if oppo become aware that you're super accepting on anything, but shouldn't take us below the odds required for game at teams. At pairs, things might get a bit closer - especially when making +170 might still be a good board. You might want to hold off on the very worst hands here.

So I think there's some merit to super-accepting a lot in these positions, but don't go crazy. 56% is well in your favour, but is not a cast-iron certainty. You are allowed to use judgement too!

Monday 27 April 2009

Open 5C?

Just a quickie. Here's a hand which has done the rounds today. You hold, at green (non-vulnerable vs vulnerable):

K 2 -- J 2 A K J 10 6 5 4 3 2

Yep, that's nine clubs. Do you open it 1 or 5?

I'm not going to type away at length about what I think is best, but you might be interested in the probabilities of what can and can't make on the deal. Use them as you see fit.
  • 5 will make about 54% of the time, 6 26% and 7 7.4%.
  • 3NT will make by your hand 31% of the time.
  • In 5.3% of cases, 3NT will make while 5 will fail. Yes, it might be impractical to get to 3NT in these situations, but impractical is better than impossible.
  • Oppo can make 5 17% of the time, 5 7.1% of the time and 5 5.6% of the time. Why the diamond/spade discrepancy? I actually made LHO the declarer in all cases for convenience. With partner on lead, I'm happy to ruff a heart with a diamond but ruffing a heart with a spade may lead to a dropped trump trick.
  • On the hands where you can make 5, oppo have a profitable sacrifice (going one off at worst) in 5 12% of the time, in 5 3.1% and in 5 2.2%. If you count going for -500 as neutral then these go up to 22%, 9.1% and 6.2%. Of course, on some of these deals we can make slam.
  • Oppo have a profitable sacrifice in any suit on 14% of deals (there is plenty of overlap, so this isn't the sum of the above values).
  • Oppo have an average of 7.4 spades, 7.4 diamonds and 8.6 hearts between them.

All figures are based on a 1000-deal simulation. I'll run it with more deals overnight and let you know if anything changes remarkably.

Thursday 8 January 2009

Is going off in a game worse than missing an overtrick?

It's been a while since the last post, but I promised neither frequency nor regularity so won't apologise! I've just not been doing very much simulating recently. Somebody did ask me a question towards the end of last year so I might post on that subject at some point. Anyway, on to today's topic, which isn't even about simulations at all.

Your partner is declaring a game contract and has to tackle a suit of AKJx opposite xxxx. With zero information to go on other than the a priori odds, he plays for the drop and goes down one, -100. At your teammates' table, they take the finesse and make the contract, +620, lose 12 IMPs. Your partner has just carved the contract and cost your team 12 IMPs. What an idiot! And you tell him so.

Now, this isn't a piece about being polite to partner. You'd be better off keeping quiet and moving on to the next board, but some people can't keep schtum and have to say something. It's the magnitude that I'm questioning. You shouldn't tell him off for losing 12 IMPs, you should tell him off for losing 0.8 IMPs.

What am I talking about? He clearly lost 12 IMPs because there's a big 12 written in the minus column and it was all his fault! But this doesn't account for the fact that he might have been successful in his line on a luckier day, or it might have made no difference. He wasn't always going to lose 12 IMPs when he made this decision.

These are the probabilities of the various opposition holdings, courtesy of Richard Pavlicek's calculator tool:

East West Ways %
1 Qxxxx — 1 1.96
2 Qxxx x 4 11.30
3 Qxx xx 6 20.35
4 Qx xxx 4 13.57
5 Q xxxx 1 2.83
6 xxxx Q 1 2.83
7 xxx Qx 4 13.57
8 xx Qxx 6 20.35
9 x Qxxx 4 11.30
10 — Qxxxx 1 1.96

It's quite straight-forward. For instance, line 1 shows that there is a 1.96% chance of East having all five missing cards. The blue lines are where it makes no difference which line you take. If the suit is 5-0, for example, both the finesser and the dropper will realise on the first round and make the same number of tricks. The red line is where the dropper will make while the finesser will go off. The green line is where the finesser will make while the dropper will go off. The finesser wins 20.35% of the time and the dropper 13.57% of the time. The ratio between these is why you see in books that the finesse is a 3:2 favourite.

Let's look at it in terms of IMPs. For all the blue cases — about two thirds of the time — it's a flat board. For the green case the finesser wins 12 IMPs. For the red case the dropper wins 12 IMPs. Thus, the finesser will win on average (0.6608 * 0) + (0.2035 * 12) + (0.1357 * -12) = 0.8136 IMPs.

As you can see, the 12 IMPs your partner cost the team is a mirage. He made a 0.8 IMP mistake — the rest of it was just bad luck. If his line had made it would still have been a 0.8 IMP mistake, even if it had gained IMPs. Now, 0.8 IMP mistakes are fairly bad as things go — if you make them on every board of a 32-board match you'll lose by a whole 26 IMPs — but there are far worse crimes at the bridge table.

Here's an example of a far worse crime. You're declaring 3NT and have 10 tricks on top. You merrily cash them away, lose concentration, don't realise you're actually squeezing somebody and your six of clubs is good. You've dropped an overtrick and your team loses 1 IMP. No probability calculations are needed — your play had no upside and you just took a 0% line for 11 tricks when you had a 100% line available. Your mistake was worth precisely 1 IMP, clearly greater than 0.8 IMPs. Next time your partner takes a view and plays for the drop instead of finessing, don't be so hard on him — especially if you dropped an overtrick earlier on!

Now one thing (as you may be shouting out now) which I've ignored here is variance. Given the choice of which mistake to make you might claim you'd still prefer to lose an overtrick, because if you're 5 IMPs up going into the last board of a knockout match then the overtrick error will never cost anything, whereas the failure to finesse will cost the match 20% of the time. And that might be true but it does require some fairly rigid assumptions. It goes out the window when you play a league match, or a multiple teams event, or it's early on in a sufficiently long knockout match. For the vast majority of situations, all you should need to worry about is maximising your expected number of IMPs.

One lesson you might learn from this is to not let yourself get bogged down in esoteric safety plays and squeeze chances and ignore simple basics like concentration and card counting. Very few of these plays will gain you more than half an IMP of advantage over the 'normal' line. It's all a waste of time as soon as you make a silly mistake and let through a no-play game costing 12 IMPs. Even if you only make one such mistake every 100 boards (and very few of us could say that), you're going to have to find the half-IMP brilliancy every 4 boards in order to compensate. The random deal just doesn't provide that kind of ammunition.

Other lessons you might learn are ones of partnership harmony. Don't be so hard on partner when his mistake appears to cost a game swing. At least consider whether his play had an upside or whether it would usually have made no difference at all. You've almost certainly made lots of marginally negative plays too, but they didn't happen to get highlighted by fate. And try to remember that just the other week you took a finesse to win 10 IMPs when you should have played for a 3-2 break and earned a flat board. It was still an error, despite the outcome, and partner said nothing.