The Google Books Ngram Viewer is terrific fun, and extremely clever. It lets you search for the frequency of all sorts of words and phrases in all the published books that Google have scanned in. You could get lost in it for hours and obviously I ran some bridge queries to see what came up.
Here we see how contract bridge took over from auction bridge in the 1930s, and how both have gradually declined since that incredible peak.
This is a weird one. For the most part there are as many who win at bridge as who lose at bridge, but during the war the losers spike massively. This doesn't appear to be caused by actual bridges being destroyed; if you do the search yourself you can see that most of the books it lists are talking about playing cards. Maybe it reflects the mood of the day?
Here we see the history of poor bridge, at least in the English-speaking world. I love the humungous spike in the 1820's - there must have been some truly terrible bridge players around in those days.
Finally, we have proof, as if it was needed, that the beer card is the most important card. It gets substantially more press than the cards on either side, for almost the whole of the 20th century.
Saturday 1 October 2011
Sunday 6 June 2010
New Blog
Nothing to do with bridge, but in case anybody a) is still reading this and b) has some interest in old films you might want to see my other blog. That is all.
Wednesday 3 June 2009
Breaking Transfers
A request!
This one shouldn't be too tricky. Let's give ourselves a 20-22 2NT opener with four hearts and give partner a hand with five or more hearts. He transfers and you are wondering whether you should super-accept or if the 3 level is the right place to play.
Over 10,000 deals, we made the following numbers of tricks:
In other words, we made game 87%, made precisely 3H 9.5% and couldn't make 3H 3.3% of the time. On the face of it, it looks pretty good for bashing game every time because the chances are very good that it'll make.
But this is playing partner for the full possible range of his bid. On a large proportion of these deals, he won't be passing the transfer out and game won't be missed anyway. So let's look at those deals where partner has not very many points:
Here it tells us that if partner has a Yarborough you'll make game on 55/188 occasions (29%), you'll make your partscore on 57/188 occasions (30%) and go off in 3H the rest of the time (40%). And things, unsurprisingly, get better as partner gets more points.
If you take the full 0-3 range, where partner would probably pass your transfer, you're making game 56% of the time.
Now, I haven't taken into account the possibility of being doubled. It might make a difference occasionally, especially if oppo become aware that you're super accepting on anything, but shouldn't take us below the odds required for game at teams. At pairs, things might get a bit closer - especially when making +170 might still be a good board. You might want to hold off on the very worst hands here.
So I think there's some merit to super-accepting a lot in these positions, but don't go crazy. 56% is well in your favour, but is not a cast-iron certainty. You are allowed to use judgement too!
Partner and I have been discussing a more liberal attitude to transfer breaks after a 2NT opening. I've suggested breaking should be mandatory with any 4-card holding, regardless of the rest of opener's hand, on the grounds that 10 tricks must stand a chance with a 6-4 fit even if responder has a Yarborough. Obviously it's not so good if it's a 5-4 fit, but most of the time responder will have a few scattered points.
If you have an idle moment, please can you simulate expected number of tricks holding 0,1,2,3... etc. HCP opposite a balanced 20-22 HCP (a) when the fit is 5-4 (b) when the fit is 6-4?
This one shouldn't be too tricky. Let's give ourselves a 20-22 2NT opener with four hearts and give partner a hand with five or more hearts. He transfers and you are wondering whether you should super-accept or if the 3 level is the right place to play.
Over 10,000 deals, we made the following numbers of tricks:
6 5
7 39
8 283
9 946
10 2156
11 3148
12 2439
13 984
In other words, we made game 87%, made precisely 3H 9.5% and couldn't make 3H 3.3% of the time. On the face of it, it looks pretty good for bashing game every time because the chances are very good that it'll make.
But this is playing partner for the full possible range of his bid. On a large proportion of these deals, he won't be passing the transfer out and game won't be missed anyway. So let's look at those deals where partner has not very many points:
Pts 4H 3H tot
0 55 57 188
1 160 145 388
2 275 185 520
3 602 188 843
4 926 185 1143
5 1095 102 1209
Here it tells us that if partner has a Yarborough you'll make game on 55/188 occasions (29%), you'll make your partscore on 57/188 occasions (30%) and go off in 3H the rest of the time (40%). And things, unsurprisingly, get better as partner gets more points.
If you take the full 0-3 range, where partner would probably pass your transfer, you're making game 56% of the time.
Now, I haven't taken into account the possibility of being doubled. It might make a difference occasionally, especially if oppo become aware that you're super accepting on anything, but shouldn't take us below the odds required for game at teams. At pairs, things might get a bit closer - especially when making +170 might still be a good board. You might want to hold off on the very worst hands here.
So I think there's some merit to super-accepting a lot in these positions, but don't go crazy. 56% is well in your favour, but is not a cast-iron certainty. You are allowed to use judgement too!
Monday 27 April 2009
Open 5C?
Just a quickie. Here's a hand which has done the rounds today. You hold, at green (non-vulnerable vs vulnerable):
Yep, that's nine clubs. Do you open it 1 or 5?
I'm not going to type away at length about what I think is best, but you might be interested in the probabilities of what can and can't make on the deal. Use them as you see fit.
All figures are based on a 1000-deal simulation. I'll run it with more deals overnight and let you know if anything changes remarkably.
K 2 -- J 2 A K J 10 6 5 4 3 2
Yep, that's nine clubs. Do you open it 1 or 5?
I'm not going to type away at length about what I think is best, but you might be interested in the probabilities of what can and can't make on the deal. Use them as you see fit.
- 5 will make about 54% of the time, 6 26% and 7 7.4%.
- 3NT will make by your hand 31% of the time.
- In 5.3% of cases, 3NT will make while 5 will fail. Yes, it might be impractical to get to 3NT in these situations, but impractical is better than impossible.
- Oppo can make 5 17% of the time, 5 7.1% of the time and 5 5.6% of the time. Why the diamond/spade discrepancy? I actually made LHO the declarer in all cases for convenience. With partner on lead, I'm happy to ruff a heart with a diamond but ruffing a heart with a spade may lead to a dropped trump trick.
- On the hands where you can make 5, oppo have a profitable sacrifice (going one off at worst) in 5 12% of the time, in 5 3.1% and in 5 2.2%. If you count going for -500 as neutral then these go up to 22%, 9.1% and 6.2%. Of course, on some of these deals we can make slam.
- Oppo have a profitable sacrifice in any suit on 14% of deals (there is plenty of overlap, so this isn't the sum of the above values).
- Oppo have an average of 7.4 spades, 7.4 diamonds and 8.6 hearts between them.
All figures are based on a 1000-deal simulation. I'll run it with more deals overnight and let you know if anything changes remarkably.
Thursday 8 January 2009
Is going off in a game worse than missing an overtrick?
It's been a while since the last post, but I promised neither frequency nor regularity so won't apologise! I've just not been doing very much simulating recently. Somebody did ask me a question towards the end of last year so I might post on that subject at some point. Anyway, on to today's topic, which isn't even about simulations at all.
Your partner is declaring a game contract and has to tackle a suit of AKJx opposite xxxx. With zero information to go on other than the a priori odds, he plays for the drop and goes down one, -100. At your teammates' table, they take the finesse and make the contract, +620, lose 12 IMPs. Your partner has just carved the contract and cost your team 12 IMPs. What an idiot! And you tell him so.
Now, this isn't a piece about being polite to partner. You'd be better off keeping quiet and moving on to the next board, but some people can't keep schtum and have to say something. It's the magnitude that I'm questioning. You shouldn't tell him off for losing 12 IMPs, you should tell him off for losing 0.8 IMPs.
What am I talking about? He clearly lost 12 IMPs because there's a big 12 written in the minus column and it was all his fault! But this doesn't account for the fact that he might have been successful in his line on a luckier day, or it might have made no difference. He wasn't always going to lose 12 IMPs when he made this decision.
These are the probabilities of the various opposition holdings, courtesy of Richard Pavlicek's calculator tool:
It's quite straight-forward. For instance, line 1 shows that there is a 1.96% chance of East having all five missing cards. The blue lines are where it makes no difference which line you take. If the suit is 5-0, for example, both the finesser and the dropper will realise on the first round and make the same number of tricks. The red line is where the dropper will make while the finesser will go off. The green line is where the finesser will make while the dropper will go off. The finesser wins 20.35% of the time and the dropper 13.57% of the time. The ratio between these is why you see in books that the finesse is a 3:2 favourite.
Let's look at it in terms of IMPs. For all the blue cases — about two thirds of the time — it's a flat board. For the green case the finesser wins 12 IMPs. For the red case the dropper wins 12 IMPs. Thus, the finesser will win on average (0.6608 * 0) + (0.2035 * 12) + (0.1357 * -12) = 0.8136 IMPs.
As you can see, the 12 IMPs your partner cost the team is a mirage. He made a 0.8 IMP mistake — the rest of it was just bad luck. If his line had made it would still have been a 0.8 IMP mistake, even if it had gained IMPs. Now, 0.8 IMP mistakes are fairly bad as things go — if you make them on every board of a 32-board match you'll lose by a whole 26 IMPs — but there are far worse crimes at the bridge table.
Here's an example of a far worse crime. You're declaring 3NT and have 10 tricks on top. You merrily cash them away, lose concentration, don't realise you're actually squeezing somebody and your six of clubs is good. You've dropped an overtrick and your team loses 1 IMP. No probability calculations are needed — your play had no upside and you just took a 0% line for 11 tricks when you had a 100% line available. Your mistake was worth precisely 1 IMP, clearly greater than 0.8 IMPs. Next time your partner takes a view and plays for the drop instead of finessing, don't be so hard on him — especially if you dropped an overtrick earlier on!
Now one thing (as you may be shouting out now) which I've ignored here is variance. Given the choice of which mistake to make you might claim you'd still prefer to lose an overtrick, because if you're 5 IMPs up going into the last board of a knockout match then the overtrick error will never cost anything, whereas the failure to finesse will cost the match 20% of the time. And that might be true but it does require some fairly rigid assumptions. It goes out the window when you play a league match, or a multiple teams event, or it's early on in a sufficiently long knockout match. For the vast majority of situations, all you should need to worry about is maximising your expected number of IMPs.
One lesson you might learn from this is to not let yourself get bogged down in esoteric safety plays and squeeze chances and ignore simple basics like concentration and card counting. Very few of these plays will gain you more than half an IMP of advantage over the 'normal' line. It's all a waste of time as soon as you make a silly mistake and let through a no-play game costing 12 IMPs. Even if you only make one such mistake every 100 boards (and very few of us could say that), you're going to have to find the half-IMP brilliancy every 4 boards in order to compensate. The random deal just doesn't provide that kind of ammunition.
Other lessons you might learn are ones of partnership harmony. Don't be so hard on partner when his mistake appears to cost a game swing. At least consider whether his play had an upside or whether it would usually have made no difference at all. You've almost certainly made lots of marginally negative plays too, but they didn't happen to get highlighted by fate. And try to remember that just the other week you took a finesse to win 10 IMPs when you should have played for a 3-2 break and earned a flat board. It was still an error, despite the outcome, and partner said nothing.
Your partner is declaring a game contract and has to tackle a suit of AKJx opposite xxxx. With zero information to go on other than the a priori odds, he plays for the drop and goes down one, -100. At your teammates' table, they take the finesse and make the contract, +620, lose 12 IMPs. Your partner has just carved the contract and cost your team 12 IMPs. What an idiot! And you tell him so.
Now, this isn't a piece about being polite to partner. You'd be better off keeping quiet and moving on to the next board, but some people can't keep schtum and have to say something. It's the magnitude that I'm questioning. You shouldn't tell him off for losing 12 IMPs, you should tell him off for losing 0.8 IMPs.
What am I talking about? He clearly lost 12 IMPs because there's a big 12 written in the minus column and it was all his fault! But this doesn't account for the fact that he might have been successful in his line on a luckier day, or it might have made no difference. He wasn't always going to lose 12 IMPs when he made this decision.
These are the probabilities of the various opposition holdings, courtesy of Richard Pavlicek's calculator tool:
East West Ways %
1 Qxxxx — 1 1.96
2 Qxxx x 4 11.30
3 Qxx xx 6 20.35
4 Qx xxx 4 13.57
5 Q xxxx 1 2.83
6 xxxx Q 1 2.83
7 xxx Qx 4 13.57
8 xx Qxx 6 20.35
9 x Qxxx 4 11.30
10 — Qxxxx 1 1.96
It's quite straight-forward. For instance, line 1 shows that there is a 1.96% chance of East having all five missing cards. The blue lines are where it makes no difference which line you take. If the suit is 5-0, for example, both the finesser and the dropper will realise on the first round and make the same number of tricks. The red line is where the dropper will make while the finesser will go off. The green line is where the finesser will make while the dropper will go off. The finesser wins 20.35% of the time and the dropper 13.57% of the time. The ratio between these is why you see in books that the finesse is a 3:2 favourite.
Let's look at it in terms of IMPs. For all the blue cases — about two thirds of the time — it's a flat board. For the green case the finesser wins 12 IMPs. For the red case the dropper wins 12 IMPs. Thus, the finesser will win on average (0.6608 * 0) + (0.2035 * 12) + (0.1357 * -12) = 0.8136 IMPs.
As you can see, the 12 IMPs your partner cost the team is a mirage. He made a 0.8 IMP mistake — the rest of it was just bad luck. If his line had made it would still have been a 0.8 IMP mistake, even if it had gained IMPs. Now, 0.8 IMP mistakes are fairly bad as things go — if you make them on every board of a 32-board match you'll lose by a whole 26 IMPs — but there are far worse crimes at the bridge table.
Here's an example of a far worse crime. You're declaring 3NT and have 10 tricks on top. You merrily cash them away, lose concentration, don't realise you're actually squeezing somebody and your six of clubs is good. You've dropped an overtrick and your team loses 1 IMP. No probability calculations are needed — your play had no upside and you just took a 0% line for 11 tricks when you had a 100% line available. Your mistake was worth precisely 1 IMP, clearly greater than 0.8 IMPs. Next time your partner takes a view and plays for the drop instead of finessing, don't be so hard on him — especially if you dropped an overtrick earlier on!
Now one thing (as you may be shouting out now) which I've ignored here is variance. Given the choice of which mistake to make you might claim you'd still prefer to lose an overtrick, because if you're 5 IMPs up going into the last board of a knockout match then the overtrick error will never cost anything, whereas the failure to finesse will cost the match 20% of the time. And that might be true but it does require some fairly rigid assumptions. It goes out the window when you play a league match, or a multiple teams event, or it's early on in a sufficiently long knockout match. For the vast majority of situations, all you should need to worry about is maximising your expected number of IMPs.
One lesson you might learn from this is to not let yourself get bogged down in esoteric safety plays and squeeze chances and ignore simple basics like concentration and card counting. Very few of these plays will gain you more than half an IMP of advantage over the 'normal' line. It's all a waste of time as soon as you make a silly mistake and let through a no-play game costing 12 IMPs. Even if you only make one such mistake every 100 boards (and very few of us could say that), you're going to have to find the half-IMP brilliancy every 4 boards in order to compensate. The random deal just doesn't provide that kind of ammunition.
Other lessons you might learn are ones of partnership harmony. Don't be so hard on partner when his mistake appears to cost a game swing. At least consider whether his play had an upside or whether it would usually have made no difference at all. You've almost certainly made lots of marginally negative plays too, but they didn't happen to get highlighted by fate. And try to remember that just the other week you took a finesse to win 10 IMPs when you should have played for a 3-2 break and earned a flat board. It was still an error, despite the outcome, and partner said nothing.
Monday 17 March 2008
Fourth Seat Weak Twos
A team-mate writes:
Thanks for the question! This shouldn't be too difficult to do. We'll deal out three hands which wouldn't open the bidding and fix ours. For simplicity we'll assume that the opposition's third seat style is the same as their first seat style. Let's say they open all 12-counts and all 7-loser hands. As explained in this post, it doesn't matter much that this criteria will exclude some genuine hands and let through some false ones — the overwhelming majority will be miles from the borderline.
In order to gather this data I actually wrote some new functions for Deal which makes it all a lot simpler. This lets me produce lovely big tables like this puppy (from a sample size of 10,000 deals):
The labels along the top should be self-explanatory. <8s means that East/West have less than 8 spades between them. 2H+ means that we can make 8 or more tricks in hearts, double-dummy.
Along the left side, NSH means North/South combined hearts; EWS means East/West combined spades; Htks means the number of tricks North/South can make in hearts and Stks is the number East/West can make in spades.
I started to do some analysis of when hearts isn't our best fit or when spades isn't the oppo's best fit but these are actually very unlikely and so I didn't pursue the matter. The fact is that we have a 10 count and nobody has opened yet. Therefore, the points are distributed fairly evenly between the other three hands. And since nobody has opened at the one level or with a preempt, it must mean that they don't have much distribution.
The good thing about nice big tables like this is I can just dump it to the screen and let you all do the conclusions! But I'll throw some points at you for free.
Sorry, I forgot to run stats on when both sides make exactly 9 tricks — a good time to pass this out. Here is the full double-dummy cross table (using 10,000 new deals).
The important bit is highlighted red. This shows that, of the 3535 times when 3 made exactly, 3 made 884 times — about a quarter of the time.
Partner's view is that a fourth in hand weak two should be within a trick of making, i.e. 6.5 to 7.5 playing tricks. I gave him4 A K Q 6 5 4 J 10 3 7 6 3
and his reaction was "Pass in a nanosecond. What else?"
I contend that this hand is worth 2 after three passes. My reasoning: on the evidence so far, my expectation would be that we have 8/9 hearts between us, and oppo have 8/9 spades. So by LTT this is likely to be a 17-trick hand. By virtue of the concentration of hearts in my hand, and the absence of a 2 opening by oppo, I judge we are more likely to make 3 than they are to make 3. So the par contract is either 3 tick, or 3X-1, depending on the vulnerability. Either way, we are more likely than not to go positive. Hence it’s better to open 2 than pass. A simulation should help prove or disprove this hypothesis.
Thanks for the question! This shouldn't be too difficult to do. We'll deal out three hands which wouldn't open the bidding and fix ours. For simplicity we'll assume that the opposition's third seat style is the same as their first seat style. Let's say they open all 12-counts and all 7-loser hands. As explained in this post, it doesn't matter much that this criteria will exclude some genuine hands and let through some false ones — the overwhelming majority will be miles from the borderline.
In order to gather this data I actually wrote some new functions for Deal which makes it all a lot simpler. This lets me produce lovely big tables like this puppy (from a sample size of 10,000 deals):
E/W Spade Fit N/S Heart Fit DD Tricks
NSH <8s =8s =9s >9s <8h =8h =9h >9h 2H+ 2S+ tot
7 478 371 172 1021 595 430 1021
8 1597 2102 1313 105 5117 4221 3147 5117
9 896 1299 937 280 3412 3205 2229 3412
10 48 171 172 55 446 438 396 446
11 3 1 4 4 4 4
EWS <8s =8s =9s >9s <8h =8h =9h >9h 2H+ 2S+ tot
5 14 1 10 3 8 14
6 533 136 281 115 1 392 3 533
7 2472 341 1306 778 47 1983 441 2472
8 3943 371 2102 1299 171 3313 2908 3943
9 2597 172 1313 937 175 2349 2426 2597
10 426 104 271 51 404 413 426
11 15 1 9 5 14 15 15
Htks <8s =8s =9s >9s <8h =8h =9h >9h 2H+ 2S+ tot
5 12 6 15 3 6 18
6 151 86 33 2 110 154 8 163 272
7 473 538 215 21 301 739 199 8 856 1247
8 1193 1341 811 102 378 2004 958 107 3447 2220 3447
9 872 1422 1032 216 185 1721 1430 206 3542 2217 3542
10 291 486 422 81 32 432 703 113 1280 655 1280
11 26 64 74 16 58 106 16 180 78 180
12 1 10 3 6 8 14 11 14
Stks <8s =8s =9s >9s <8h =8h =9h >9h 2H+ 2S+ tot
1 17 14 3 16 17
2 14 8 6 7 14
3 7 2 1 2 5 1 8 9
4 59 13 15 30 1 49 59
5 319 4 79 131 105 8 265 323
6 976 107 4 2 187 555 331 16 938 1089
7 1183 922 167 11 311 1245 703 24 1999 2283
8 408 1857 957 111 279 1862 1082 110 2891 3333 3333
9 35 921 1089 201 133 1097 828 188 1811 2246 2246
10 1 124 340 100 18 173 283 91 432 565 565
11 6 38 14 15 33 10 43 58 58
12 2 2 3 1 4 4 4
<8s =8s =9s >9s <8h =8h =9h >9h 2H+ 2S+ tot
tot 3019 3943 2597 441 1021 5117 3412 450 8463 6206 10k
The labels along the top should be self-explanatory. <8s means that East/West have less than 8 spades between them. 2H+ means that we can make 8 or more tricks in hearts, double-dummy.
Along the left side, NSH means North/South combined hearts; EWS means East/West combined spades; Htks means the number of tricks North/South can make in hearts and Stks is the number East/West can make in spades.
I started to do some analysis of when hearts isn't our best fit or when spades isn't the oppo's best fit but these are actually very unlikely and so I didn't pursue the matter. The fact is that we have a 10 count and nobody has opened yet. Therefore, the points are distributed fairly evenly between the other three hands. And since nobody has opened at the one level or with a preempt, it must mean that they don't have much distribution.
The good thing about nice big tables like this is I can just dump it to the screen and let you all do the conclusions! But I'll throw some points at you for free.
- (highlighted blue) 2 will make about 85% of the time. Can you really afford to pass this opportunity up?
- (red) Of the 6206 times where 2 makes, 3 will make 2961 times.
- (green) You'll make game in hearts a full 15% of the time!
- (purple) There's no guarantee that oppo have a spade fit at all. Even if they manage to find (and this is unlikely) every 5-3 and every 4-4 fit then it only comes to about 70% of cases. And well over half of these are 8 card fits where the suit breaks 4-1.
Update: Another Table
Sorry, I forgot to run stats on when both sides make exactly 9 tricks — a good time to pass this out. Here is the full double-dummy cross table (using 10,000 new deals).
Htks 2H- 2S- 2H= 2S= 3H= 3S= 4H+ 4S+ tot
5 26 10 8 5 3 26
6 230 95 54 46 35 230
7 1348 450 385 355 158 1348
8 1138 3350 1012 917 283 3350
9 1361 1290 3535 748 136 3535
10 614 451 202 1303 36 1303
11 117 58 15 192 2 192
12 13 3 16 16
Stks 2H- 2S- 2H= 2S= 3H= 3S= 4H+ 4S+ tot
1 1 14 4 8 1 14
2 3 11 7 1 11
3 1 9 3 2 3 9
4 12 55 12 14 17 55
5 49 335 92 140 54 335
6 149 1067 316 385 217 1067
7 340 2294 704 811 439 2294
8 447 1012 3271 1290 522 3271
9 406 917 748 2291 220 2291
10 179 255 122 37 593 593
11 16 28 13 1 58 58
12 1 1 2 2
2H- 2S- 2H= 2S= 3H= 3S= 4H+ 4S+ tot
tot 1604 3785 3350 3271 3535 2291 1511 653 10k
The important bit is highlighted red. This shows that, of the 3535 times when 3 made exactly, 3 made 884 times — about a quarter of the time.
Monday 21 January 2008
Responding 3NT to a Preempt
Three hands with a similar theme have cropped up recently:
North opened 1, I overcalled 3 as East and partner bid 3NT to play. Oppo started off with a couple of rounds of clubs but then got bored and switched and partner wound up with an overtrick. You may not agree with my choice of overcall, but give me an extra heart and it makes no difference to the outcome — 4 is substantially the better contract.
At our team-mates' table, North opened 3 in first, East passed and South tried 3NT. Not a great success as you can see. 4 has no chance either but it's a lot fewer undertricks.
At a friend's table, North opened 3 in first, East passed and South tried 3NT rather than the raise. It worked out fine on a low diamond lead, but could have gone horribly wrong with 4 excellent.
Bad luck or bad judgement? Let's give our partners some likely hands for their preempts and simulate how the two strains compare.
On the first hand, with LHO opening 1 and partner overcalling 3, I ran 1000 tests. On 498 of those, both contracts failed or both contracts made. However, on every single one of the remaining 502 deals, 3NT went off with the major game making. Never was 3NT better. In terms of IMPs (and I assumed that we were vulnerable for all tests and never doubled), playing in hearts scores you a whopping 7.4 IMPs/board. The reasoning, I suppose, goes as follows: if partner has good enough hearts to run then it's highly unlikely that he's able to stop the club suit.
Next, the spade preempt and again 1000 tests were carried out. This was a lot closer. In fact, the raise to 4 won by only a single case. On 187 occasions the major game was making with 3NT failing, while on 186 the reverse occurred. The rest of the time, both contracts made or both went off. The IMPs score was more favourable to those playing in suit contracts, though, with an average gain of 1.9 IMPs/board. This reflects that, while it's fairly even in terms of purely making your contract, 3NT is likely to go off more and those vulnerable undertricks can add up.
And finally, the other heart preempt when we had that four-card support. This time, of the 1000 tests, 40 resulted in a game swing for 3NT, 330 for raising to the heart game, while the other 630 were more neutral. In all, you gain an average of 5.5 IMPs/board by playing in hearts.
Obviously, the oppo may well have a blind lead. On hand 1, a club lead might not be obvious from a lot of North's holdings and 3NT will sneak home. Nevertheless, I think that a figure of 7.4 IMPs/board is pretty convincing, as is 5.5 IMPs/board for hand 3. Hand 2 is much closer.
Generalisations to follow. Some day. If you're lucky.
1. S: 963
H: 9
D: K7654
C: AKQ3
S: AKT2 S: J84
H: K53 H: QJT842
D: AQT2 D: 9
C: 52 C: JT6
S: Q75
H: A76
D: J83
C: 9874
North opened 1, I overcalled 3 as East and partner bid 3NT to play. Oppo started off with a couple of rounds of clubs but then got bored and switched and partner wound up with an overtrick. You may not agree with my choice of overcall, but give me an extra heart and it makes no difference to the outcome — 4 is substantially the better contract.
2. S: KJ98765
H: 9
D: 42
C: 743
S: A S: 42
H: KJT852 H: Q74
D: Q6 D: KJT983
C: T952 C: AK
S: QT3
H: A63
D: A75
C: QJ86
At our team-mates' table, North opened 3 in first, East passed and South tried 3NT. Not a great success as you can see. 4 has no chance either but it's a lot fewer undertricks.
3. S: 9743
H: AJ98752
D: K
C: 9
S: A8 S: QT52
H: 43 H:
D: A9642 D: QJT5
C: Q652 C: KJ843
S: KJ6
H: KQT6
D: 873
C: AT7
At a friend's table, North opened 3 in first, East passed and South tried 3NT rather than the raise. It worked out fine on a low diamond lead, but could have gone horribly wrong with 4 excellent.
Bad luck or bad judgement? Let's give our partners some likely hands for their preempts and simulate how the two strains compare.
On the first hand, with LHO opening 1 and partner overcalling 3, I ran 1000 tests. On 498 of those, both contracts failed or both contracts made. However, on every single one of the remaining 502 deals, 3NT went off with the major game making. Never was 3NT better. In terms of IMPs (and I assumed that we were vulnerable for all tests and never doubled), playing in hearts scores you a whopping 7.4 IMPs/board. The reasoning, I suppose, goes as follows: if partner has good enough hearts to run then it's highly unlikely that he's able to stop the club suit.
Next, the spade preempt and again 1000 tests were carried out. This was a lot closer. In fact, the raise to 4 won by only a single case. On 187 occasions the major game was making with 3NT failing, while on 186 the reverse occurred. The rest of the time, both contracts made or both went off. The IMPs score was more favourable to those playing in suit contracts, though, with an average gain of 1.9 IMPs/board. This reflects that, while it's fairly even in terms of purely making your contract, 3NT is likely to go off more and those vulnerable undertricks can add up.
And finally, the other heart preempt when we had that four-card support. This time, of the 1000 tests, 40 resulted in a game swing for 3NT, 330 for raising to the heart game, while the other 630 were more neutral. In all, you gain an average of 5.5 IMPs/board by playing in hearts.
Obviously, the oppo may well have a blind lead. On hand 1, a club lead might not be obvious from a lot of North's holdings and 3NT will sneak home. Nevertheless, I think that a figure of 7.4 IMPs/board is pretty convincing, as is 5.5 IMPs/board for hand 3. Hand 2 is much closer.
Generalisations to follow. Some day. If you're lucky.
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